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Legislating Chevron
Elizabeth Garrett*
One of the most significant administrative law cases, Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,1 is routinely referred to as “the counter-Marbury.”2 The
reference suggests that Chevron’s command to courts to defer to certain reasonable
agency interpretations of statutes is superficially an uneasy fit with the declaration in
Marbury v. Madison that “[i]t is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”3 According to the consensus view, Chevron deference
is consistent with Marbury, as long as Congress has delegated to agencies the power to
make policy by interpreting ambiguous statutory language or filling gaps in regulatory
laws.4 In saying what the law is, the courts determine that the law demands deference to
the agency’s decision. As Henry Monaghan wrote before Chevron: “A statement that
judicial deference is mandated to an administrative ‘interpretation’ of a statute is more
appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some substantive law-making

*

Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Southern California. I
appreciate very helpful comments from Rachel Barkow, Jody Freeman, Andrei Marmor, Eric Posner, Cass
Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule, and conversations with Linda Cohen, Barry Friedman, Dennis Hutchinson,
and Jim Rossi.
1
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2
For perhaps the first such reference, see Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2075 (1990). See also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore
Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1105, 1108 (2001) (stating that Chevron has
“taken on canonical status as the ‘counter-Marbury’ for the administrative state”).
3
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
4
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 863 (2001);
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 215 (2002);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced
Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 746-47 (2002). A very few scholars resist the notion that
congressional delegation can solve the Marbury problem apparently caused when courts are not the
primary interpreters of the law. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 452, 477 (1989). See also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action 563 (1965) (twenty years before Chevron, discussing judicial deference
to agency interpretations and noting that the propriety of the practice “assumes, of course, that under our
system of law an agency may not only apply rules, but may make them”). This symposium will no doubt
shed new light on this debate.
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authority has been conferred upon the agency.”5 His use of the passive tense here could
obscure one important part of his formulation: It is Congress that has conferred such
lawmaking power on the agencies; thus, judicial deference stems from an understanding
that it is emphatically the province and duty of the legislative department to determine
whether agencies or the courts should determine policy by interpreting statutes.
Congressional delegation is not important just to reconcile modern administrative law
with Marbury; it is also the reason provided by courts to justify strong deference to
agency interpretations of law. Chevron held that
[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. … Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.6
Although it cut back on the scope of Chevron, United States v. Mead7 underscored that
strong judicial deference is a product of either an explicit or implicit delegation by
Congress.8 In the first part of this article, I will discuss the various ways courts have
reached decisions about the delegation issue and provide a brief assessment of them.
In the end, none of the judicial methods to determine whether Congress actually
delegated law-interpreting authority to agencies can satisfactorily achieve that objective.
Without explicit congressional direction regarding which institution, courts or agencies,
should have the primary role in interpreting statutes, the institutional choice is necessarily
made by courts when they decide cases that require such interpretation. Although they
tend to justify their decisions by reference to congressional intent, in the absence of such
intent or without effective methods to ascertain it, the judicial branch decides whether or
not to defer to agencies based on judges’ views of policy, institutional competence, and
other factors. Some scholars have argued that, if the decision has been effectively left to
the courts, judges should devise and consistently apply a general rule of construction of
5

Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1983). See also John
H. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 621-22, 627 (1996) (using Monaghan’s analysis to reconcile Marbury and
Chevron).
6
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
7
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
8
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
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regulatory statutes based on an explicit consideration of the institutional capacities of the
courts and agencies.9 Recourse to congressional intent is inevitably unavailing, the
argument goes, so courts should more transparently base their approach on other factors.
My project in this article is not to argue in favor of a particular rule of judicial
review but rather to focus on a feature common to all of them. Whether courts search for
some direction from Congress or whether they allocate interpretive authority based on
other factors, all the methods of judicial review provide that a clear congressional
instruction overrides any judicial rule. As Thomas Merrill and Kristin Hickman explain:
The conclusion that Chevron rests on an implied delegation from Congress … has
important implications for Chevron’s domain: It means that Congress has ultimate
authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine, and that courts should attend
carefully to the signals Congress sends about its interpretative wishes.10
Similarly, those who argue in favor of a consistently-applied interpretive regime based on
institutional, nonintentionalist grounds anticipate that “clear instructions of Congress”11
can vary the effect of the default. Why hasn’t Congress more often taken advantage of
this power to signal its intentions clearly? Does its silence allow us to assume that
Congress virtually always agrees with the judicial approach in these cases? Are the
procedural hurdles faced by Congress in passing legislation with clear directives to courts
and agencies so formidable that the opt-out features in all the judicial approaches are
illusory?12 Are we sufficiently confident that Congress has a realistic opportunity to
communicate clearly when it wishes to depart from whatever approach the courts are
currently applying? If the opt-out feature of all these methods of judicial review is not a
real option for Congress, then the emphasis put on the possibility of congressional
involvement in justifying an approach or in constructing a default rule is misplaced at
best, and serves as deceptive and confusing window-dressing at worst.

9

See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. ___ (2003)
(forthcoming) (arguing in favor of an institutional approach).
10
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 836. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead
Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 Admin. L . Rev. 807, 823 (2002)
(explaining that “Christiansen [v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)] and Mead make it clear that
Congress has the authority to turn Chevron deference on and off”).
11
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, supra note 9, at ___.
12
See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review 101 Mich. L. Rev. ___, [11] (2003) (noting that
what he calls “provisional review” may not be “provisional in practice” if Congress cannot overcome
hurdles to legislating different instructions).
3
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To the extent that anyone mentions the possibility of greater congressional
involvement,13 it is quickly dismissed because Congress seldom provides explicit
instructions allocating this sort of policymaking authority and because it is seen as
unrealistic to expect that Congress will improve its performance.14 In the second part of
this article, I describe a mechanism that could provide Congress an opportunity to
provide explicit instructions about law-interpreting authority. Low expectations for
congressional performance stem in part from a failure to think creatively about the kinds
of legislative vehicles available to Congress and about internal rules that can structure its
deliberation. Past discussions assume that Congress could signal its delegation decision in
one of two ways. First, Congress could pass a broad statute that would allocate the lawinterpreting function either to agencies or courts with respect to all statutes unless
subsequent laws vary the default rule. Arguably, Section 706 of the Administrative
Procedure Act15 is a broad statement delegating that authority to courts, contrary to the
rule adopted in Chevron.16 Alternatively, Congress could make the decision with respect
to each statute, perhaps also amending previously enacted statutes that are silent on the
issue.
I suggest that Congress has another way to communicate its choice among
institutions. In statutes that periodically re-authorize administrative agencies and large
federal programs or that annually appropriate funds to agencies, Congress could
determine on an agency-by-agency basis whether to delegate the power to make policy
through statutory interpretation with respect to all statutes that the agency administers, or
13

Merrill briefly discusses this option, considering both the possibility that Congress might pass a broad
statute or that it would provide instructions statute-by-statute. See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at
824-25.
14
See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 203, 227.
15
5 U.S.C. § 706.
16
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power Over Statutory Interpretation, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1239, 1249
(2002) (reading section 706 as an express congressional affirmation of “judicial power over law
declaration”). But see Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 871 (“Chevron deference
is consistent with the APA’s direction to courts to decide all relevant questions of law because virtually all
the statutes that reflect an implicit delegation of interpretational authority either postdate the APA or have
been reenacted since its passage. … In effect, every time Congress has made an implied delegation to an
administrative agency, it has silently amended section 706 of the APA.”). Michael Herz disputes Merrill
and Hickman’s suggested reading of section 706 and Chevron, noting that the APA states that no
subsequent statute can supersede or modify the APA unless it does so expressly. See Michael Herz,
Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1663, 1664-65
(1992) (citing section 559 of the APA).
4
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with respect to some subset of decisions. Congress could define that subset using a
procedural metric, as the Court appears to do in Mead, or on some other basis. The
congressional decision could be based on the variety of factors, including those identified
by courts and others as relevant to whether a delegation of law-interpreting authority to
agencies makes sense. In particular, Congress could assess the performance of each
agency and judge whether it is the best entity to make the policy decisions inherent in
interpreting vague or ambiguous statutory language. Congress would also have the ability
to revise its determination over time as it re-assessed agency performance.
This proposal is designed to take seriously the feature of judicial review of
regulatory statutes that contemplates the possibility of an active role for Congress. There
are two decisions in the context of regulatory policy that require choices between
institutions. First, either Congress or the judiciary has to decide which governance
institution has the primary responsibility for shaping regulatory policy through statutory
interpretation. This decision implicates the design and authority of administrative
agencies; it is a decision that determines the contours of the policymaking process over
time. In part because of the tension between modern regulatory precedents and Marbury17
and in part because the decision to vest an institution with law-interpreting authority is
such a vital aspect of policymaking, the various proposals for judicial review provide
Congress the first opportunity to make the choice of interpreters. But if Congress does
not fill this role for some reason, the courts must decide whether to interpret the statute
themselves or defer to reasonable agency views. Which institution is the primary
interpreter is thus the second institutional choice decision, and it can be made on various
grounds, all of which are better suited for consideration by Congress but which are not
impossible for courts to assess and apply.
In this complex interplay among the various government players, we could be
more confident that Congress actually has the capacity to intervene occasionally, or even
frequently, if a procedural framework made the issue more salient to lawmakers when
they decided other similar issues of regulatory design. To put it more bluntly, if we want
to pay more than lip service to the notion that Congress might be a vital player in

17

See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511,
513-14 (discussing the tension between modern administrative law approaches and Marbury).
5
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decisions to allocate interpretive authority to other institutions, we should think seriously
about procedures that could empower legislators in this realm. If we decide that actual
congressional involvement will never or only rarely occur, even with new actionprompting procedures, then our attention would be better focused on developing judicial
strategies to allocate interpretive authority without reference to congressional intentions.
I.

Discovering—or Constructing—Congressional Intent to Delegate
The traditional challenge presented by the interaction of Chevron and Marbury is

to determine in a particular case whether Congress actually has delegated lawinterpreting power to an agency. There are occasional explicit delegations, just as there
are sometimes specific statutory provisions revealing that Congress has determined that
courts should interpret statutory terms without any enhanced attention to the agency’s
views.18 Such explicit instructions may have once occurred more frequently than they do
now. Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Tongue Watts reveal that in the first half of the
twentieth century, Congress followed a drafting convention to signal that it intended to
authorize agencies to act with the force of law, a power that included the ability to
interpret ambiguous language and fill statutory gaps. Pursuant to this convention, when
Congress delegated to an agency the authority to adopt rules and regulations with a
specific provision authorizing it to impose sanctions for violations of such rules, Merrill
and Watts argue that Congress intended agencies to act with “force of law.”19 The courts
failed to pick up on this coded signal,20 but the congressional convention may
demonstrate that the legislature has sometimes considered the delegation issue and
reached a conclusion, albeit one cryptically conveyed.

18

For cases dealing with explicit delegations to agencies, see United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455
U.S. 16, 24 (1981); Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1981); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S.
247, 253 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1976); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
44 (1981); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 613-14 (1944). Barron and Kagan
provide an example of Congress’ explicitly instructing courts to determine interpretive issues “without
unequal deference” to the agency view. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 216 n.58
(citing Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, enacted in 1999).
19
See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 503-26 (2002).
20
Id. at 475.
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Nonetheless, express congressional instructions are rare, so in most cases a court
must work to determine if there has been an implicit delegation. The cases reveal various
approaches to this question, some that are more rule-like in nature, and others that rely on
more open-textured standards. Courts have moved between the two approaches, currently
resting somewhere in the middle. Moreover, even when courts have adopted a relatively
bright-line rule apparently requiring deference to agencies in many circumstances, in
practice judges have often resisted deferring to agency interpretations, deciding instead
that the statutory language clearly compels only one result. In the absence of explicit
congressional communication, any quest for congressional intent may obscure what is
actually occurring: the judiciary is determining whether to defer to an agency
interpretation without any guidance, implicit or otherwise, from Congress.
Although courts deferred to some agency interpretations of statutes before
Chevron,21 the basis for deference was not entirely clear and often seemed to rest on the
agency’s power to persuade the court that its interpretation, a product of its expertise, was
the best understanding of vague or ambiguous language. Chevron can be understood as
adopting a rule-like presumption that statutory silence or ambiguity should be read as an
implicit delegation to agencies. The rule-like quality of Chevron was in part a reaction to
the complex, multifactor approach to judicial deference used in the pre-Chevron era.22 By
providing a clear default rule that all cases of statutory ambiguity would be understood as
a delegation to the agency to determine the meaning of the text, Chevron attempted to
provide certainty and predictability for Congress, agencies and the regulated. The most
enthusiastic proponent of Chevron as an across-the-board presumption, Justice Scalia, did
not argue that it would capture actual congressional intent in many, or even most cases.23
Indeed, as a textualist, Scalia is not particularly concerned with congressional intent in
any context, expressing strong doubts that it is a coherent concept.24 Instead, he

21

See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). See also id. at 130 (at least suggesting
that part of the reason for deference to the Board should be whether Congress “entrusted” the relevant
decision to the agency).
22
See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 562-67
(1985) (discussing factors used).
23
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 517. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the
Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 406, 445 (1989) (“An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of lawinterpreting power. Chevron confuses the two.”).
24
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 16-18 (1997).
7
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maintained that “any rule adopted in this field merely represents a fictional, presumed
intent, and operates principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate.”25
The connection between Chevron’s presumption and actual congressional wishes
is further undermined because the presumption has been applied to all regulatory statutes,
not just those passed after the Court changed its approach from a multifactor analysis to a
strong presumption. For statutes enacted before 1984, including the Clean Air Act
provision at issue in Chevron, Congress could not be presumed to have relied on the
default rule and therefore used ambiguity to signal its delegation of law-interpreting
authority to agencies. Notwithstanding the lack of connection between the presumption
and an actual congressional intent to delegate in many contexts, proponents argue that the
rule allows for certainty in the future. If the rule is applied consistently, Congress can
draft statutes in reliance on the default regime.26 Thus, if Congress is silent about which
institution has the primary responsibility for interpreting unclear statutory text, the
legislature can be fairly understood as intending that agencies to fulfill that role. In
addition, an across-the-board presumption offers the promise of reducing judicial
decision costs. In theory, a bright-line rule that ambiguity or silence results in deference,
absent congressional instructions to the contrary, is easy for judges to apply, particularly
compared to a multifactor standard. Finally, use of the rule has been justified because any
errors (measured against the baseline of what Congress intended) occur in favor of
policymaking by a more democratically accountable institution, the executive branch,
rather than by the insulated, unelected and life-tenured judicial branch.27
Chevron’s rule-like quality has caused substantial unease for some judges and
scholars, however, largely because of the doctrinal importance of congressional

25

Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 517. See also Mead, 533 U.S. at 313 (Scalia, dissenting) (arguing that
the principle of Chevron is “rooted in a legal presumption of congressional intent, important to the division
of powers” between the branches of government).
26
See Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 517 (suggesting that for statutes enacted after the adoption of the
Chevron presumption, congressional silence might fairly be read as a delegation to an agency to provide
meaning for vague or ambiguous terms).
27
See, e.g., John F. Manning, supra note 5, at 627 (“Chevron adopts a background presumption that
reconciles now firmly established conceptions of delegation with constitutional structure. It is more
consistent with the assumptions of our constitutional system to vest discretion in more expert,
representative, and accountable administrative agencies.”).
8
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delegation.28 For many, the key question remained whether Chevron led to deference
only, or even mainly, in cases where Congress actually delegated interpretive power to
the agencies, or whether the rule was over-inclusive, requiring judicial deference even in
cases where Congress had no intent or would have preferred a more aggressive judicial
stance.29 Moreover, in practice, Chevron has not provided a certain background regime
against which Congress can act, a factor which may undermine any legislative will to
provide express directives. The scope of Chevron is unclear,30 and judges can avoid
deferring to the agency interpretation if they find that statutory meaning is clear and
unambiguous. By aggressively employing methods of statutory construction, courts
decide cases at Step One of Chevron, thereby saying what the law is in the traditional
sense and avoiding deference to reasonable agency understandings that the judges do not
share.31 Scalia acknowledged that one reason he supports Chevron as an across-the-board
presumption is that his method of interpretation allows him to resolve many cases at Step
One and to avoid the distasteful prospect of accepting an agency view with which he
disagrees.32 In addition, at Step Two a judge can avoid deferring to arguably reasonable
interpretations by finding conflicts between the agency’s policy decision and the judge’s
reading of the Act’s purposes or goals.33
Several commentators have observed, after conducting various studies of the case
law, that the effect of Chevron on judicial outcomes has not been as significant as one
might have expected, although many found some increased level of judicial deference to
28

A rule like Chevron’s may be persuasively defended on grounds other than congressional delegation, a
possibility I will discuss further infra, text at notes 68 through 71.
29
See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 470-71.
30
Steven Croley, Scope of Chevron, available online at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevronscopejuly.doc (5th Draft July 2001). Merrill observed
recently that the Chevron rule has elements of a more open-textured standard, undermining the
predictability that it promises, although it is more rule-like than the judicial approach before 1984 and than
the one adopted in Mead. See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at 808-09, 818.
31
See Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, paper prepared for
the Scope of Judicial Review portion of the Project on the Administrative Procedure Act, ABA’s
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice Section, Third Revised Draft June 2001 with Supplementary
Material added February 2003 (assessing judicial practice applying Step One of Chevron).
32
See Antonin Scalia, supra note 17, at 521.
33
M. Elizabeth Magill, Step Two of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, available online at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/abachevron1.doc (4th Draft July 2001). Levin has argued
convincingly that many of these cases are really Step One cases although the statutory interpretation by the
court is done when assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation. He terms such cases
“belatedly discovered clean meaning” cases. See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two
Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253, 1283-84 (1997).
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agency interpretations.34 If Congress and interest groups are uncertain about the
application of the judicial rule, crafting a legislative response is more difficult.
Uncertainty about how Chevron will be applied has been exacerbated by uncertainty
caused by the frequent shifts in the judicially-constructed background rule. It has never
been entirely clear if all the justices shared Scalia’s view that Chevron operated as an
across-the-board presumption, for example, and the majority opinion in Mead rejects
such an understanding, claiming it an inaccurate portrayal of judicial practice.35
Given the doctrinally pivotal role of congressional delegations in legitimizing
deferential judicial review, some have advocated that the courts work to discern in each
case whether Congress intended, or would have intended, that the agency interpret
unclear statutory language. Writing a few years after Chevron, then-Judge Breyer agreed
with Scalia that congressional intent to delegate in these cases is a “kind of legal fiction”
in that it is often constructed by courts without any explicit directive from the
legislature.36 Breyer argued that courts should work to find implicit congressional intent
by analyzing what a reasonable legislator would have intended with regard to the
delegation issue, in light of all the practical circumstances surrounding the particular
enactment. In other words, to reduce errors in the judicial determination of whether
Congress wanted or would have wanted to delegate law-interpreting powers to an agency,
courts should employ a multifactor approach reminiscent of the pre-Chevron analysis.37
But this approach is not wholly satisfactory for those pursuing an intentionalist course,
either. The use of such a standard imposes high decision costs on the judiciary, and even
if judges use such an approach in a sophisticated manner, they may still misjudge
34

Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal
Administrative Law, 1990 Duke L.J. 984 (1990); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the
Chevron Puzzle, 57 L. & Contemp. Probs. 65 (1994); Aaron P. Avila, Application of the Chevron Doctrine
in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. Env'l L.J. 398 (2000) (all finding some effect on deference attributable to
Chevron). Compare with See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J.
969, 970 (1992) (finding no “discernible relationship” between Chevron and greater deference and also
considering the role of textualism during this period). All these findings are somewhat unsatisfying, and
more suggestive than conclusive, because of limitations in the data. For example, after the adoption of a
new approach became clear to litigants, the mix of cases reaching courts shifted as those who lost before
agencies challenged only the decisions that they believed likely to be overturned. See also Peter H. Schuck
& E. Donald Elliott, supra, at 995-96, 1060-61 (discussing limitations in data and study design but
concluding that the analysis nonetheless shed light on important questions).
35
Mead, 533 U.S. at 237-38.
36
Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986).
37
Id. at 370-73. See also Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 528 (acknowledging difficulty for courts of a
multifactor and nuanced approach but arguing that it is constitutionally compelled).
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whether Congress intended, or would have intended, to delegate law interpretation to the
agencies.
Recently, the Court has tried to resolve the disagreement by adopting a sort of
middle ground. In Mead, the Court articulated a standard of judicial review that has both
rule-like and standard-like components. The objective of the new approach is the same as
the objective articulated in Chevron: to discover Congress’ intent as to which
institution—courts or agencies—should make policy by interpreting ambiguous or vague
statutory language.38 Mead holds that deference is appropriate when “Congress would
expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addressed ambiguity
in the statute or fills a space in the enacted law.”39 To reach a conclusion that an agency
has the power to regulate with the force of law, Mead appears to allow judges and
agencies to rely on a safe harbor, holding that “it is fair to assume generally that Congress
contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively
formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force.”40 Thus, when an agency promulgates its
statutory interpretation as part of notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication,
or formal rulemaking, courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous text because they should infer that Congress has delegated that authority to
agencies when it accorded them the power to act through such procedures.
If the choice of format entirely determined the level of deference and controlled
the finding of implicit congressional delegations, Mead’s formulation would have the
virtues of a relatively predictable rule, albeit one with a narrower scope than Chevron’s
broad presumption. But the Court went on to say that “the want of that procedure does
not decide the case, for we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even
when no such administrative formality was required and none was afforded.”41 Thus,
38

See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 479 (noting that Mead court “made
clear that Chevron deference is grounded in a congressional intent to delegate primary interpretive
authority to the agency”).
39
Mead, 544 U.S. at 229.
40
Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. Merrill and Watts argue that the agency’s use of such procedures is itself not
sufficient to allow a conclusion that Congress intended the agency to have the power to act with force of
law. The determination of Congress’ intent should be a separate inquiry from the question whether the
agency then used the procedures necessary to promulgate a regulation with legislative force. See Thomas
W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 477-81.
41
Mead, 533 U.S. at 231.
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circumstances other than the formality of procedures authorized by Congress can give
rise to deference because of delegation, but Mead provides little guidance about what
those circumstances might be.42 In general, they would be factors suggesting that
Congress intended the agency to act with force of law, an inference easily drawn, the
Court says, when Congress allows agencies to use certain procedures to regulate, but also
possible in other unspecified circumstances.
To the extent that Mead posits a general rule to discern implicit congressional
intent, the link between the procedure authorized and the amount of law-interpreting
authority delegated is not immediately clear. As Ronald Levin has observed, “If the
notion that Congress regularly contemplates Chevron deference in passing regulatory
legislation is a fiction, as it seems widely agreed, surely the notion that Congress
regularly makes decisions about whether a given procedural format should trigger
Chevron deference is even more of a fiction.”43 David Barron and Elena Kagan similarly
argue that in some cases Congress may want courts to exercise independent and relatively
aggressive judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes even when the
interpretation is provided through formal procedures or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Conversely, in some cases Congress may want “to give interpretive authority to an
agency separate and apart from the power to issue rules or orders with independent legal
effect on parties.”44 The point is that Mead’s safe harbor is not necessarily an accurate
proxy for congressional delegation to agencies, although perhaps it is a tighter fit than the
broader Chevron rule because it affects a smaller subset of agency decisions and
considers one factor that is surely relevant to discovering actual intent. But by raising the
procedural issue to a safe harbor, Mead sacrifices the objective of getting the delegation
question right in favor of certainty and predictability—a goal that it then undermines by
suggesting vaguely that other circumstances might also dictate substantial judicial
deference.45 Supreme Court opinions since Mead can be read to suggest that the Court is
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For an indictment of Mead’s hybrid approach, see Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, __ Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2003).
43
Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of Discretion, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 771, 792 (2002).
44
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 218-19.
45
Some judicial deference may be appropriate even for interpretations by agencies that are not promulgated
through formal procedures and that do not exhibit any other features that would allow courts to infer that
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returning to a multifactor approach, assessing a variety of considerations relevant to
either discovering an implicit congressional delegation or determining what a reasonable
legislature would have done in a particular case.46
The challenges posed for courts of a multifactor standard are substantial because
so many factors might be relevant. As Barron and Kagan observe: “Congress’s view on
deference (were Congress to consider the matter) likely would hinge on numerous casespecific and agency-specific variables, not readily susceptible to judicial understanding or
analysis.”47 Various relevant factors can be discerned from the case law and other
discussions of the formulation of regulatory policy. Any judicial attempt to discern
congressional intent or to conclude what the legislature might intend if members thought
about the issue could require consideration of at least four types of issues, some of which
have not played a role in judicial deliberations in the past. First, the kind of question
arguably delegated to the agency is relevant in the inquiry. Whether Congress has
delegated broadly or narrowly, whether the issue lies in the particular expertise of the
agency and of experts generally,48 whether it depends primarily on qualitative or
quantitative assessments,49 and whether it relates to other areas in which the agency has
broad authority would be appropriate considerations. Some of these factors are mentioned
in Chevron as justification for finding delegation in ambiguity.50
Second, as Mead indicates, the kind of procedure authorized by Congress and
used by the agency seems pertinent, but more than just the formality of the process ought
to be considered in the application of a multifactor standard. For example, the
transparency of the process,51 the degree of participation by affected interests, and the
legal effect of the action that will emerge from the process (i.e., whether the ruling is
because the agency interpretation is persuasive and reflects superior expertise, a less stringent level of
deference provided in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
46
See William S. Jordan III, Updating Deference: The Court's 2001-2002 Term Sows More Confusion
About Chevron, 32 ELR 11459, 11463-67 (2002) (discussing cases).
47
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 223.
48
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, supra note 16, at 1255-56.
49
See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Toward a Jurisprudence of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 100 Mich. L. Rev.
1708, 1731 (2002) (arguing for more deference to quantitative analysis by agencies, although one could
make arguments for precisely the opposite conclusion if qualitative judgments depended more crucially on
policy determinations).
50
See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-66.
51
See, e.g., Michael J. Hayes, After “Hiding the Ball” is Over: How the NLRB Must Change Its Approach
to Decision-Making, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 523, 565 (2002) (discussing NLRB cases where courts have
emphasized this factor).
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broadly applicable and perhaps whether it is self-executing52) all seem relevant
considerations. Third, Barron and Kagan have argued that deference ought to rest in some
degree on who in the agency has made the actual interpretive decision, so that only
decisions made by “the official Congress named in the relevant delegation” would qualify
for Chevron deference.53 One might disagree with the emphasis that Barron and Kagan
place on this factor,54 but it certainly is a candidate for consideration at least in some
circumstances.
Fourth, although seemingly overlooked in the case law, characteristics of the
particular agency are no doubt relevant to Congress when it decides whether to delegate
law-interpreting powers. Notwithstanding the importance of this factor, none of the
judicial approaches, whether they are rule-like or standard-like, make distinctions on the
basis of which agency is interpreting the statute. Instead, Chevron’s rule has been applied
to any ambiguous statutory language, regardless of which agency was charged with
administering the regulatory program. Similarly, Mead’s safe harbor of certain formal
procedures is available for any agency that has been granted the power to use such
formats for policymaking. The absence of agency-specific considerations in the analysis
seems strange, at least to the extent that the tests purport to discern actual congressional
intent. Congress’ decision to delegate authority to a particular agency is informed by both
its view of agency capabilities generally and the reputation and qualifications of the
particular agency.
Notwithstanding their apparent relevance, agency-specific variables tend not to be
considered explicitly by courts, even when they use multifactor standards rather than
across-the-board rules. Of course, determinations of agency expertise, arguably relevant
to Chevron deference, perhaps available under Mead, and certainly relevant to
application of Skidmore deference, can sometimes involve varying degrees of agencyspecific evaluations.55 One suspects that courts also treat agencies differently on the basis

52

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 891 (discussing this factor in a
different context).
53
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 235-36.
54
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, supra note 19, at 578-79 n.620.
55
See Jim Rossi, supra note 2, at 1135-36 (discussing in context of deference to rulings by the EEOC).
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of their reputations, although this factor is not expressly identified as influential.56 For
example, some have noted that the National Labor Relations Board seems to be given
less deference, in part because of its preference to make policy through adjudication and
not rulemaking57 but also because its reputation makes it suspect in some quarters.58
Other agencies with problematic reputations, like the Federal Election Commission and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may also receive less deference in practice,
although this reality is seldom explicitly stated in opinions.59
If one wants to determine whether Congress really has delegated law-interpreting
power to an agency, assessing the characteristics and general reputation of the agency is
crucial. Relevant factors would include whether the agency is independent or under the
direct control of the President, whether the agency is subject to capture by powerful
interest groups and what sort of interest group activity typifies its regulatory
environment, how politically salient the issues within the agency’s jurisdiction are for the
general public, the political pressures brought to bear on the agency by Congress, its
committees and the President, and indications that the President, the Office of
Management and Budget or other executive branch officers do not trust the agency. How
56

See Michael Abramowicz, supra note 49, at 1739 (“Perhaps courts already consider agency reputation
implicitly, seeking to curtail agencies with a reputation for stretching their authority or achieving
ideological objectives.”). See also Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, supra note 34, at 1021-22 (finding
different “success” rates for different agencies, but suggesting that those differences could be a function of
subject matter or procedural choice, rather than of agency reputation); Louis L. Jaffe, supra note 4, at 557
(making general point well before Chevron); Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, Issues in
Leg. Scholarship, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (2002): Article 9 (generally observing that agencies
have different reputations depending on their behavior).
57
It appears that interpretations adopted in formal adjudications do receive Chevron deference, a
conclusion buttressed by Mead. See Steven Croley, supra note 30, at 3 (describing application of Chevron
to formal adjudications). However, scholars have argued whether such deference in the context of formal
adjudications is appropriate, and the judicial treatment has not been consistent. See Michael J. Hayes, supra
note 51, at 564-71 (discussing scholarly debate and judicial opinions, but concluding that deference to
NLRB adjudications is appropriate under Chevron and Mead).
58
Not only might judges, particularly conservative ones, view the NLRB with distrust, but the statutory
framework in which the Board operates might suggest that Congress views the agency as less deserving of
deference. See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 10, at 832. Merrill and Hickman argue that less deference is
appropriately paid to NLRB interpretations through adjudication because the Board’s orders are not selfexecuting. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, supra note 4, at 892. But see David J. Barron &
Elena Kagan, supra note 4, at 219 (arguing that the fact courts must execute NLRB adjudicatory orders
ought not to make a difference in the level of deference).
59
The observation in the text is based in part on my experience as a clerk in the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals and on the views of other clerks, including the moderator of this panel. Of course, both agencies
have received Chevron deference in the past. See William S. Jordan III, Judicial Review of Informal
Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron Step Two, not Christensen or Mead, 54 Admin. L. Rev.
719, 731 (2002).
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these factors play out in each case is not obvious. For example, does evidence that the
President is not pleased with the agency’s regulatory decisions indicate that the agency
relies on expertise, rather than politics, to set policy? And how should an agency weigh
political considerations with other factors in interpreting its organic statute?
This list of factors is by no means exhaustive, although its breadth and complexity
provide a sense of the challenge to courts in applying multifactor standards. The
complexity is increased because the mix of factors will change over time as Congress’
view of appropriate delegations changes, or as the relationship among the branches
evolves. Moreover, the factors will sometimes point to different conclusions about the
congressional delegation even within the same statute, adding to the complications.60 In
short, both types of judicial approaches—the across-the-board presumption which
provides certainty (at least in theory) at the price of errors in determining congressional
intent and the more nuanced standard which imposes decision costs on the judiciary with
uncertain improvements in the error rate—have limitations. The fact that both types of
judicial review are not entirely satisfactory may explain why courts have been unable to
settle on one or the other and, for the time being, are inconsistently applying an uneasy
combination of the two.
Although both Marbury and modern administrative law precedents indicate that
Congress decides whether agencies or courts will be the primary interpreters of
regulatory statutes, and that courts merely ascertain congressional intent as they
determine “what the law is,” the reality is that the judiciary, not Congress, is in the
driver’s seat. Express congressional directives are virtually nonexistent, and courts are
unable to accurately find an implicit delegation or guess what the legislature might have
done had it thought about the matter. Thus, the first institutional choice decision—which
institution decides who will be the primary interpreter of unclear statutes—has been
effectively resolved in favor of courts. One suspects that, among other considerations, the
judges’ views of the wisdom of the agency’s interpretation affect the strength of the
deference.61 It is not therefore surprising that courts often determine that deference is
60

See Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 472 (discussing Breyer’s approach).
See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, supra note 34, at 108-09 (correctly predicting that the
relatively politically conservative Supreme Court justices would adopt doctrines requiring less deference to
agency interpretations as the Democrats had more influence on agency outcomes); Linda R. Cohen &
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unwarranted; then judges do not face the unattractive prospect of upholding agency
interpretations with which they do not agree. In other words, courts are interested parties
with respect to the second institutional choice determination, and not surprisingly, they
make the choice in favor of judicial primacy in many cases. But because they understand
that the doctrine demands they obey any congressional instruction, the jurisprudence has
been unstable as courts vacillate among various unsatisfactory methods purporting to
enable them to find congressional intent. Courts seem unwilling to eschew the inquiry
into intent altogether and explicitly embark on the formulation of a judicial doctrine,
perhaps based solely on institutional considerations, that could provide more certainty for
regulated parties, agencies, and Congress.
But is this the only possible state of affairs? How would the second institutionalchoice decision—whether agencies or courts have the primary responsibility to interpret
statutes—be resolved if Congress more frequently provided clear instructions? Whether
such explicit congressional directives are likely or even possible is the question I turn to
next.
II.

Providing Congress the Opportunity to Legislate Chevron

The decision to delegate law-interpreting authority to an agency or a court is different
from the sort of delegation decision Congress usually makes in the regulatory context.
Typically, Congress is determining substantive policy, and the extent of detail it provides
in the delegation will determine how much discretion the subsequent policymaker has as
it pursues regulatory objectives. Here, however, the delegation concerns which institution
is given the discretion to set policy—courts or agencies. Congress can provide more or
less detail to constrain the discretion, and that decision may be affected by the
congressional view of the institution that will exercise the discretion. Nonetheless, it may
be helpful to differentiate this delegation decision—which institution makes policy
through statutory interpretation—from the decision of how to delegate and with what
Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical
Test, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 431, 474-75 (1996) (finding that “the Court does not uniformly endorse judicial
deference, but rather does so discriminately in the years where the doctrine yields policy outcomes more to
the Court’s liking.”).
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amount of specificity, the decision that the delegation scholarship typically focuses on.62
As I discussed above in the context of describing how courts might assess that choice
between institutions, a variety of factors are relevant to determine institutional
competence to make policy within the authority delegated through vague, ambiguous, or
incomplete language. These factors relate to the nature of the issue, the procedures
through which agency interpretations will be reached, the position of the agency official
likely to adopt the interpretation, the reputation and expertise of the agency itself, the
need for a relatively independent determination rather than a decision infused with
politics and specific regulatory missions, and the need to integrate an interpretive
decision into a complex regulatory framework. Congress is better suited than the courts to
weighing these factors in the larger context of designing the regulatory state and those
entities that will administer it.
A.

Congress and Opt-Out Provisions of Default Rules of Judicial Review
of Regulatory Statutes

Congress, because of its frequent interactions with agency personnel, has a better
sense than the judicial branch of the expertise that can be brought to bear by a particular
agency on a question of statutory interpretation. Lawmakers either already know or can
easily gather information using committees, staff and witnesses about the larger statutory
framework in which an agency works, the general level of discretion accorded to the
agency, and the reputation that the agency has developed over time and enjoys currently.
Little of that information will be available to a court trying to determine, within the
confines of a particular case dealing with specific facts and parties, whether it should
defer to an agency interpretation of a few words of statutory text. In addition, Congress
can revise its decision to delegate authority to an agency or the judiciary to account for
changes in the regulatory environment, changes that are often related to expertise but
might also turn on changes in the political environment. A court finds revision more
62

See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People Through
Delegation (1993). To the extent the scholarship focuses on institutional choice questions, it is usually
concerned with the choice among agencies, taking account of their different characteristics. See, e.g., David
Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Approach to Policy Making Under
Separate Powers 151-54 (1999).
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difficult, both because it must wait for an appropriate case and because it often lacks the
information necessary to justify changing course. Thus, Congress has technocratic
advantages over courts for a variety of reasons: its institutional design, access to experts,
repeat interactions with the agency, and a more comprehensive perspective.
Political considerations also play a vital role in any decision to allocate lawinterpreting authority to an agency or to the courts because interpretation in these
contexts is an aspect of regulatory policymaking. Determining the appropriate regulatory
program, including identifying regulatory objectives, prioritizing among various
objectives in a world of limited resources, and choosing the means to reach the objectives
considered most worthy of attention, is a process that necessarily and appropriately
involves both expertise and politics. Agencies are sensitive to the demands of two
political principals that they serve—the President and Congress—and constantly balance
those demands within the structure of the regulatory framework put into place by an
earlier group of lawmakers and shaped by the history of the actions of other Presidents
and executive branch officers.63 Chevron’s preference that agencies interpret ambiguous
statutory language or fill in statutory lacunae was based in part on the Court’s
understanding of the relevance of policy and politics to such determinations and its own
institutional limitations in this respect.64 However, it might be the case that, in some
circumstances, the enacting Congress will prefer that policymaking through interpretation
be more insulated from current political pressures than is possible in the agency
environment, even in an independent agency that is somewhat separate from the
President. Whatever the allocative choice, it is based in part on political considerations—
that is, deciding how extensive a continuing role politics should play in regulatory
policymaking is itself a political decision, taking account of the need to consider current
political realities during implementation of a regulatory structure devised in the past.
Once it is acknowledged that political considerations are legitimate, along with
expertise-related considerations, in the interpretation of regulatory statutes, the
desirability of Congress’ playing a more active role in allocating law-interpreting
authority either to agencies or courts becomes apparent. Congress has the comparative
63

See Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 56, at 14 (discussing various political influences at work to shape
agency policymaking).
64
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
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advantage over the judiciary in making the determination concerning the appropriate role
of politics and making it publicly. Courts are loathe to discuss political factors
transparently in their opinions. In a related context of judicial review of the
reasonableness of the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s decision
under President Reagan to rescind certain passive restraint regulations, only Justice
Rehnquist explicitly addressed the clear political overtones of the agency’s decisions:
The agency’s changed view of the [passive restraint] standard seems to be related to
the election of a new President of a different political party. … A change in
administration brought about by people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable
basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs
and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light
of the philosophy of the administration.65
The unwillingness of the State Farm majority to assess the presence and importance of
political considerations reflects a general judicial distaste for such analysis. Generally,
then, courts either try to avoid the political analysis—which denies them access to an
important consideration in the decision whether the allocate law-interpreting authority to
agencies or retain it themselves—or they do not reveal the role that such an analysis plays
in their decision, thereby undermining the ability of the public to understand and evaluate
regulatory policy. The first strategy leads to incomplete decisionmaking, and the second
is incompatible with norms of democratic accountability. Thus, Congress’ comparative
advantage is not merely technocratic, it is essentially an advantage held by the more
democratic institution in the context of political decisions that should reflect policy
judgments of representatives who must answer to the people.
If Congress has a greater capacity to compare the judicial and executive branches and
determine which should be given law-interpreting power in the context of the larger
regulatory scheme, why not require better evidence that Congress has actually made the
delegation decision? One answer is no better evidence is required. Congress would
generally want courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory text, so a
default rule allocating the power to agencies captures what is usually the right answer. If
65

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S.
29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The regulatory decision at issue in
Chevron was also the result, in significant part, of a change in presidential administration and political
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Congress has not acted in the face of judicial application of an across-the-board
presumption, then it must have approved of the effect of the default rule. To put it another
way, a default rule could be intent-mimicking in the way that some contract default rules
work to decrease transaction costs by specifying what parties would typically want.66 If
such a default rule operated successfully, Congress would have to enact express
directives only in the small number of cases where it prefers that courts serve as the
primary interpreters of vague and ambiguous language. The default rule would thus
reduce transactions costs for Congress and allow it to deploy its limited resources more
effectively.
One problem with this answer is that it is not clear that an intent-mimicking default
rule is appropriate here. When important constitutional values are at stake, as Marbury
suggests they are in this context, the default can be set so that it protects those values and
requires Congress to state explicitly that it wishes to adopt a policy close to the
constitutional gray area.67 However, if the realities of the legislative process make it
unlikely that Congress actually can enact express directives, a Marbury-inspired default
rule means that courts will defer to agencies in only a handful of cases. In that case, a
compelling normative argument can be mounted for the opposite approach: an across-theboard presumption of deference to agencies. In the face of persistent congressional
silence, courts should choose a rule that allocates lawmaking authority to the
democratically accountable and more expert agencies, rather than to the judiciary.
Perhaps that allocation comports with congressional intent, but that is not seen as the
primary justification for the rule, which is a pragmatic approach to deal with the reality of
congressional inaction. Congress, rather than courts, may have the better technocratic and
democratic credentials when it comes to allocating the power to interpret laws, but
Congress does not discharge this responsibility. It is thus better to adopt a rule that places
primary interpretive authority with the agencies, rather than the courts, because of the
former’s superior technocratic and democratic credentials.68 As this disagreement
demonstrates, the default rule of judicial review for regulatory statutes can be chosen
66

See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the Age of Legislation, 34 Tulsa L.J. 679, 681-82 (1999).
See id. at 685-86.
68
See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 Duke
L.J. 1013, 1056-57 (1998).
67

21

Legislating Chevron

3/15/03

without paying much attention to what Congress intended or might have intended.
Instead, it can be set according to one’s vision of the appropriate role of agencies and
courts in policymaking through statutory interpretation, but with an opt-out provision that
allows congressional variance.
Some current scholarship revolves around this disagreement over the right
background rule for courts to adopt. These scholars sometimes treat congressional intent
as a relevant but not paramount concern, but more importantly they appear to have given
up on the notion that Congress might decide how to allocate law-interpreting authority in
any but the rarest of cases. To put it another way, these scholars accept that the first
institutional choice decision I have identified—whether Congress or the courts will
decide which institution has the power to interpret regulatory statutes—has been
essentially made in favor of courts. Thus, they seek to focus our attention on ways to
improve the judicial decision about whether or not to defer to agencies. For example,
Cass Sunstein argues that such a judgment should based on institutional attributes, and he
favors locating law-interpreting authority in the agencies because their “democratic
pedigree” is clearly more impressive than the courts.69 In addition, interpretation of
ambiguous terms in regulatory statutes is closely related to “an understanding of
underlying facts,” and agencies have the better technocratic credentials to make these
judgment calls.70
Merrill and Watt also favor judicial adoption of a bright-line rule, although they link
their proposal more closely to ascertaining actual congressional intent. Their historical
analysis of judicial review of regulatory statutes concludes with a discussion of various
possible default rules, or canons, that courts could apply in a rule-like fashion. They favor
a particular approach based on their understanding of the drafting convention used by
Congress in the first half of the last century, but their primary conclusion is that the
judiciary should adopt some sort of general rule, rather than an ad hoc application of a
standard, because “then Congress will generally know what to say in a statute to
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Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 68, at 1056.
Id. at 1057. See also Adrian Vermeule, supra note 42, at [12-13] (giving serious consideration to
adopting the Mead procedural safe harbor as a rule of judicial review and adopting an institutional
approach throughout his analysis); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, supra note 9 (arguing in favor of
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delegate” to an agency the power to act with force of law.”71 They envision a dialogue
between Congress and the courts in which the legislature communicates relatively clearly
with judges through statutory language. If that institutional discussion takes place, courts
can more legitimately reach conclusions about congressional intent to delegate.
Thus, all the approaches to the question of judicial review include some role for
Congress to play, and in some cases that role is envisioned as relatively active. If the
judicial approach is conceived as intent-mimicking, then it must be grounded by some
theory about congressional intent and the ability of Congress to vary the rule when its
intent is different. If the rule is set for some other reason, either to empower the judiciary
to interpret the law in the context of regulatory statutes as it does with respect to other
statutes or to empower agencies to use statutory interpretation as a policymaking tool,
room is left for Congress to strike the balance differently in a particular case. Presumably,
the congressional opt-out feature of the default rule proposals is designed to be real and
not illusory, although few commentators hold out much hope that Congress will respond
frequently, if at all. Such pessimism has an empirical basis. Despite the invitation to
Congress to interact with the courts in setting the appropriate level of judicial review,
Congress generally remains silent. That silence is mystifying no matter what general
approach to judicial review one favors because it seems unlikely that Congress would
never—or almost never—want to vary the background interpretive regime.
Perhaps Congress’ silence reflects its confusion about the default rule. Scholarly
proposals, like those discussed above, favor consistent application of a bright-line rule
that would provide Congress with a clear interpretive background. This vision of the
optimal judicial review diverges substantially from the reality of the judiciary’s
zigzagging course through a variety of approaches, each of which is applied
inconsistently. Even after the Chevron decision, its scope remained unclear, and judges
increasingly found deference unnecessary as they aggressively used interpretive
techniques at Step One. The application of the recently-adopted Mead approach has so far
been similarly inconsistent.72 Without a certain interpretive background, Congress does
not know where to focus its attention. It is certainly unrealistic to think that it will
71
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delegate clearly in every statute, so the inability to target intelligently may reduce the
chance that it targets at all. Even in the unlikely event that courts choose a presumption
and stick with it, it is not clear that any judicial canon can be frequently salient to
lawmakers during the legislative process. Staff members and experts in the body may
think about judicial doctrines when crafting bills, but these considerations may fade in the
press of legislative business.
A legislative rule backed up with enforcement procedures can be more broadly and
frequently salient to lawmakers, particularly if the internal rules are triggered when
legislation relevant to the agency’s authority is being considered. In other words,
Congress may not have entered into this dialogue with the courts either because it has no
clear idea of what it is responding to, or because it forgets that an invitation to
communicate has been offered. Of course, Congress often finds it difficult to muster
majority support for clear statutory text, so vagueness and ambiguity in this realm may
simply be another example of the congressional penchant for open-textured language as a
way to avoid opposition and surmount the procedural obstacles to enactment. No
procedure can eliminate lawmakers’ desire to sometimes avoid making difficult political
decisions, although rules can empower a few members who seek clear resolution of such
issues to force a vote of the body on the matter.
B.

Devising an Action-Prompting Mechanism to Structure Congressional
Decisionmaking

Congressional silence may be primarily the product of congressional unwillingness to
address the issue. Rather than taking responsibility for choosing the law-interpreting
institution with respect to regulatory statutes, lawmakers may often seek to avoid the
decision by punting it to the judiciary. But it seems unlikely that Congress would avoid
making the institutional choice decision in virtually every case. Surely, there are some
instances where enough lawmakers, either because of constituent pressures, ideology, or
party pressure, would be willing to provide clear instructions if they had the power under
congressional procedures to bring the matter to the attention of the full body. The
widespread acceptance of the conclusion that Congress is very unlikely to provide clearer
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directives allocating law-interpreting authority to agencies or courts is supported by an
unduly cramped view of the legislative vehicles available for Congress to use as a means
of communication, and a general ignorance in legal scholarship of various internal
enforcement mechanisms that can increase the chance of congressional consideration of
particular issues. Only two kinds of legislative vehicles have been discussed in the
literature as mechanisms for Congress to use to opt out of a default rule of judicial
review; both have limitations.
First, Congress could pass a broad statute allocating the law-interpreting power to
either agencies or courts with respect to all questions of ambiguous language, or perhaps
assigning the power to agencies in certain defined circumstances (such as when they use
particular procedures) and to courts in all other instances. Section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act appears to be such a general articulation of institutional
choice, requiring the “reviewing court to decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional or statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action.” The Bumpers amendment, considered by Congress in the
1970s and early 1980s, was this sort of statute designed to underscore that the judiciary
should determine the meaning of statutory terms in regulatory statutes in the same way
that they interpret text in other statutes.73 Had the Bumpers amendment passed, courts
arguably would not have been justified in according substantial deference to agency
interpretations, but could have considered them only as extrinsic evidence from an expert
source.
This legislative approach has certain advantages. It applies the congressional rule to
all statutes, even those enacted in the past. It can exempt certain statutes from the blanket
rule in a savings provision, just as it can vary the rule in subsequent enactments through
express provisions. Such a congressional enactment might also be more salient to
Congress than a judicially-adopted across-the-board presumption, and thus spark more
consideration of the delegation issue when Congress enacts new regulatory statutes. In
addition, interest groups may be less influential with respect to a general provision than
73

Under Senator Bumpers’ legislation, courts would have been required to “independently” decide all
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they would be in the context of statute-specific provisions.74 Such a broad statute forces
interest groups to operate behind a somewhat opaque veil of ignorance because they
cannot be sure of their positions on all affected statutes, or they may be in different
positions depending on the program and agency.75
Nonetheless, such “superstatutes” in the regulatory arena have been problematic for
many in Congress who believe that a one-size-fits-all or one-size-fits-mostly-all approach
is heavy-handed. Others may be worried that applying such a general rule to all
previously-enacted statutes would be unwise and lead to unanticipated consequences.
Because Congress cannot possibly predict all the possible applications of the general rule,
it may be better to resolve the delegation issue in a more targeted way, or to leave the
decision to the judiciary that proceeds in a case-by-case way.76 Nonetheless, there has
been some support for the approach in the past; the Bumper amendment was nearly
enacted, passing the Senate unanimously, only a few years before the Court decided
Chevron.77
Alternatively, Congress could make the delegation decision with respect to each
regulatory statute. Not only does this seem unlikely, given past behavior and institutional
limitations, the approach affects only statutes enacted in the future. For a more
comprehensive solution, Congress would be required to embark on a parallel effort to
assess past statutes and decide what guidance is appropriate. Congress does not typically
undertake retrospective analysis of past regulatory statutes, even when it adopts new
procedural approaches that will apply broadly to future laws.78 Even if Congress was
74

See Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev.
247, 274-75 (1996) (making this point in the context of different “supermandate” proposals in the
regulatory arena).
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See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J. 399 (2001) (making
point generally); Elizabeth Garrett, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Future Democratic Politics, in The
Future of Democratic Politics: Principles and Practices __, __ (G. Pomper & M.D. Weiner eds. 2003)
(forthcoming) (discussing this type of interest group behavior in a different congressional context).
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See Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 34, at 1031 (arguing that a Bumpers amendment approach would be
an “overreaction”).
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See Cynthia R. Farina, supra note 4, at 474-75. See also James T. O’Reilly, Deference Makes a
Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. Cin. L. Rev. 739 (1980).
But see Cass R. Sunstein, supra note 74, at 251-53 (observing that such far-reaching statutes are difficult to
pass in the regulatory context).
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See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which applied only to new mandates. Although Title
III required the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to review unfunded mandate
generally, there were no enforcement provisions in this title, unlike the provisions affecting new mandates.
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disposed to review old statutes and amend them to include instructions about lawinterpreting authority, the sheer number of regulatory statutes renders the task a
formidable one. Given limited time and energy, lawmakers would review only a few
enactments, leaving the rule with regard to the others to courts to determine.
Although pessimistic conclusions about Congress’ ability to respond to a general rule
of judicial review and delegate clearly are understandable, we can expect more from
Congress, particularly if its attention is brought to a realistic mechanism through which to
communicate. Such a mechanism could be action-forcing, or more likely it would be
action-prompting in that Congress could still avoid making an explicit decision,
notwithstanding the procedural reform. There are promising legislative mechanisms that
could be slightly reconfigured to make it more likely that Congress was aware of its
power to vary the rule of judicial review and to empower groups of lawmakers who
wished to prompt consideration and passage of express direction. These legislative
vehicles represent a middle-ground approach between a broad statute along the lines of
the Bumpers Amendment and a time-consuming statute-by-statute assessment. Congress
currently reviews agencies periodically, every few years when it re-authorizes agencies or
large programs administered by agencies, and annually when it appropriates money to
keep the government operating.79 Congress could use these periodically-considered
legislative vehicles to instruct courts and agencies about its decision with regard to lawinterpreting authority. Provisions in these bills could instruct that law-interpreting
authority was delegated generally to a particular agency, that it was delegated to an
agency in all cases where particular procedures were used, that it was delegated only with
respect to certain statutes, or that it was not delegated to the agency at all. These bills
capacity to review and amend all existing delegations to agencies to add the appropriate tag line to assure
the desired allocation of interpretational authority is reached.”).
79
Executive branch departments and agencies are funded through discretionary spending, which means that
Congress evaluates the agencies and their funding needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See
Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 Harv. J.
Legis. 387, 398-400 (1998) (describing discretionary spending and budget process generally). Some
programs administered by agencies are not funded through discretionary appropriations but instead receive
funding through direct spending, which means their funding occurs automatically until Congress amends or
repeals the underlying statute. Social Security, Medicare, and some transportation and agriculture programs
are examples of this sort of direct or mandatory spending. Although these programs are not reviewed
through the annual appropriations process and may not be reviewed periodically through the reauthorization process, they are administered by agencies that rely on discretionary funds, so the decisions
about law-interpreting authority relating to these direct spending programs could be made when agency
funding is before Congress.
27

Legislating Chevron

3/15/03

would allow Congress to resolve the issue in a more targeted way than a superstatute
would, but it would similarly provide a format where the delegation would apply to
previously-enacted statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction and to subsequent statutes.
Three different kinds of legislative vehicles—authorization laws, appropriations bills,
and omnibus appropriations legislation—could be used by Congress; however, the
formats are not equally well-suited to provide an appropriate context for congressional
deliberation and decisionmaking. First, authorizing legislation is the optimal vehicle for
such provisions. As Allen Schick explains:
Authorizations represent the exercise of the legislative power accorded to
Congress by the Constitution. … In exercising its legislative power, Congress can
place just about any kind of provision in an authorization. It can prescribe what an
agency must or may not do in carrying out assigned responsibilities. It can spell out
the agency’s organizational structure and its operating procedures. It can grant an
agency broad authority or restrict its operating freedom by legislating in great detail.80
Authorization bills design agencies, and a crucial part of agency design is what kind of
lawmaking authority, including the power to interpret ambiguous language, the agency
should receive and how it should deploy that power. Again, this type of delegation
decision is different from the typical one in a regulatory statute: here, Congress is
determining the design of regulatory institutions, not the detail of its substantive policy
instructions. Thus, the decision seems particularly well-suited to the environment of
authorizing bills; the deliberative process on the Chevron issue would be enhanced if it
occurred during a comprehensive evaluation of the agency.
There are two kinds of authorizing legislation. An organic or enabling statute sets
up the agency or program, containing broad grants of authority, establishing jobs and
duties, and spelling out policy details. Related legislation authorizes the appropriation of
funds for particular responsibilities or programs; these laws provide the basis for
subsequent and separate appropriations bills that actually provide funding.81 Since the
1960s, Congress has increasingly used temporary authorizations of the second type so
that it will have opportunities to oversee, reconsider and change programs on the basis of
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experience and the implementing agency’s performance.82 In some cases, events have
caused Congress to change programs and agencies from permanent authorizations to
temporary ones in order to increase oversight. Thus, programs like the Safe Drinking
Water Act, the Superfund, recent reform of federal welfare laws, and the Rural
Electrification Loan Restructuring program, and agencies like the Department of Justice,
NASA, and the Securities and Exchange Commission must be reauthorized periodically.
One advantage of using the authorization process to consider which institution
should have primary responsibility to interpret regulatory statutes is that it may structure
interest group activity in a relatively productive way. In many cases, the key to
harnessing interest groups is to construct an environment in which they can bring forth
information that will help lawmakers decide on their course of action83 but that also has
enough uncertainty in it that groups are not entirely sure how any particular decision will
advance their interests. The latter feature restrains the ability of groups to pursue their
narrow self-interest, although there must be enough information about the future so that
policymakers can legislate with sufficient detail.84 A moderate amount of uncertainty for
affected parties is present during the authorization process, which typically runs on a
three-, five-, or even ten-year cycle. When agencies and large programs are being
designed, or when they are being redesigned in the re-authorization process, interest
groups have some experience with the agencies and can anticipate the areas of regulatory
emphasis, so they will work to influence lawmakers and to provide them with relevant
information about the agency’s performance. However, at the same time, interest groups
may not be entirely certain of which particular issues the agency will place on the top of
the regulatory agenda in the next few years. Thus, they may not be sure whether they will
prefer courts or agencies to have the primary responsibility for statutory interpretation, a
situation that can restrain self-interested behavior to some extent.
To ensure that Congress actually considered the delegation issue and reached
some decision that was clearly expressed in the legislation, the legislature could adopt
internal rules mandating that these provisions be included in any authorization bill
82

Allen Schick, supra note 80, at 168-70.
For a discussion of the role of interest groups in providing information to policymakers, see Elizabeth
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 501, 556-61 (1998).
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reported out of committee. A modern committee report contains a great deal of
mandatory information, some required by budget rules, some by other congressional
rules. In the House, for example, each committee report contains relevant oversight
findings and recommendations, cost estimates, a statement of the constitutional authority
supporting enactment of the bill, an estimate of the costs of any federal mandate on state
and local governments, and a preemption statement.85 Although many rules deal with the
content of committee reports, congressional rules could encourage lawmakers to place
any delegation of law-interpreting authority in the legislation itself to ensure that courts
and agencies understood that the instruction has the force of law.
Internal rules governing the content of legislation and committee reports could be
enforced in both houses through a point of order process. Points of order allow members
of Congress to object to the consideration of laws that violate congressional rules and to
force a vote of the body before deliberation can proceed. In the Senate, some budget
points of order are enforced through supermajority voting requirements so that a threefifths vote is mandated to waive the objection. In the House, the point-of-order process
can be made more effective by prohibiting waiver of any such objections in the special
rule promulgated by the Rules Committee that structures floor deliberation.86 The
enforcement provisions should be calibrated to ensure that Congress would have an
opportunity to consider the issue of delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies
while not providing those who want to obstruct passage of the underlying bills too great a
strategic advantage. In this context, a relatively low level of enforcement is required,
because the Chevron issue is not especially different from other delegation issues that do
not receive enhanced protection. Thus, the procedure should rely on simple majority
votes to waive the points of order and require that a group of lawmakers agree to raise the
objection rather than allowing only one member to stall any bill on this ground. If this
mechanism is envisioned as a procedure that will be used only infrequently to vary the
application of a consistently applied judicial default rule, then the enforcement
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House Committee on Rules, A Primer on Committee Reports, available at
http://www.house.gov/rules/comm._rep_primer.htm (visited on Jan. 20, 2003).
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See Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 Duke L.J.
1277, 1326-30 (2001) (discussing such an enforcement mechanism in the context of a proposal for a
congressional framework to improve constitutional decisionmaking).
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mechanisms should be even less stringent, requiring a relatively large group of
lawmakers to trigger it and perhaps allowing waiver in the House by a special rule.
Enforcement would be easier here because interest groups affected by regulation
would have an incentive to lobby Congress either to withhold the authority from agencies
or to transfer traditional law-interpreting power to them from the courts, depending on
how they expected to fare in a particular forum. Various interest groups would be
affected differently by the decision, so there would likely be groups on both sides of the
issue. Scholars who have brought theoretical frameworks to bear on the question of
whether regulated groups generally prefer court interpretation to agency interpretation
have reached differing conclusions.87 It seems safe to say that interests have various
objectives, and that their views on the institutional choice question will change over time.
In addition, study of the process of interpretation used by courts and agencies suggests
that the two different institutions use different methods and assess information like
legislative history and canons of construction differently.88 Agencies may often reach
different conclusions than courts about the meaning of contested statutory language
because their interpretation is necessarily infused with their views of their larger
regulatory missions. Indeed, different agencies may approach interpretation differently.89
These differences in interpretive approach would be relevant to interest groups and
lawmakers. Such differences could lead interest groups to favor one interpreter or the
other in particular circumstances, depending on how they expected the different
approaches to influence the substantive outcomes.
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Compare Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial
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Although sometimes the existence of contending interest groups encourages
Congress to avoid deciding a matter, leaving it to be resolved by courts or agencies,90 a
procedural framework can make abdication more difficult or can change the message of
congressional silence. For example, once an internal rule required Congress to delegate
law-interpreting authority to agencies in particular legislative vehicles, failure to make
such a delegation might be read by courts as a signal for judges to act as primary
interpreters of regulatory statutes. Groups that prefer agency interpretation would know
that they would be less likely to convince a court to defer and thus have a greater
incentive than they do today to convince Congress to delegate explicitly. Alternatively, if
the courts adopted one of the approaches urged on them by some scholars and decided to
apply a canon consistently that requires deference to agencies either whenever statutory
text is ambiguous or a particular decisionmaking procedure is used, then congressional
silence would empower agencies. No matter what the default rule applied by courts to
determine the effect of congressional silence, once it is clearly established, interest
groups would respond accordingly, focusing their efforts on taking advantage of the
action-prompting mechanism put in place by the internal congressional rule.
Although authorizing legislation is the best vehicle for directives about lawinterpreting authority, it would not solve the problem for all statutes and all agencies.
First, some agencies and programs have permanent authorizations so periodic assessment
is not institutionalized. Nevertheless, Congress could revisit programs and agencies with
permanent authorizations and amend the statutes, and it might be somewhat more likely
to do so when the delegation issue was made salient by a new congressional process
affecting reauthorizations and new authorizing legislation. Second, Congress occasionally
fails to authorize programs to which it nonetheless appropriates money. Although internal
rules require that programs have current authorizations before appropriations are in order,
Congress can waive these rules expressly or implicitly by passing an appropriations law
that establishes or continues funding for the program or agency. Congressional rules
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discourage substantive legislation on appropriations bills, but such riders are
commonplace and have the force of law once enacted.
Accordingly, a second legislative vehicle—appropriations bills—could be used in
some instances where the authorization process was unavailable. Any new procedure
requiring Congress to delegate law-interpreting authority expressly should also apply to
appropriations bills, encouraging explicit statements of delegations for programs that are
either permanently authorized or not currently authorized. The Congressional Budget
Office maintains lists of such programs91 so it is not difficult to discover when a
delegation should occur in an appropriations bill. A point of order process could be used
to enforce the rule.
Using the appropriations process is not the best way to make the decision. One of
the reasons that legislative riders on appropriations bills are discouraged by congressional
rule and judicial decision is that the deliberation surrounding such bills focuses less on
program design and more on funding level. In the frenzy that can accompany spending
decisions, lawmakers may be less attentive to details of program and agency design. The
system of dividing authorization bills from appropriations measures is supposed to ensure
a dual level of oversight with the substantive committees shouldering the primary
responsibility for institutional design. The delegation of law-interpreting authority is
more clearly in the competence of the authorizing committees than in that of the
appropriations subcommittees. Furthermore, appropriations bills are considered and
passed annually, rather than every few years, and this frequency is not optimal for
decisions about law-interpreting authority or other fundamental aspects of regulatory
design.
Nonetheless, in the real world of the legislative process, the appropriations
subcommittees have a great deal of responsibility over substantive details of programs
and exercise some amount of oversight. Thus, they have the expertise to make this
decision, at least when compared to courts. Moreover, if the substantive committees
understand that they would cede their power to allocate law-interpreting power to other
lawmakers should they fail to live up their responsibility, they would have an incentive to
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provide directives to courts and agencies. If Congress provided its directions about law
interpretation in an appropriations bills through the mechanism proposed here, courts
would not be justified in applying the traditional canon construing riders to
appropriations bills narrowly.92 The procedural mechanism and increased scrutiny would
ameliorate the concerns about deliberative pathologies that undergird the use of the canon
in other contexts.
Of course, just as substantive committees sometimes fail to pass authorizing
legislation, in some years Congress fails to pass all the appropriations bills. In such years,
the government is funded either through continuing resolutions or, once an overall
agreement on funding has been reached, through an omnibus appropriations bill.93 These
legislative vehicles are not especially conducive to substantive provisions like those
delegating law-interpreting authority to agencies, although they can contain substantive
provisions and riders. They provide the least desirable context for Congress to legislate
Chevron issues because the environment in which they are considered and passed makes
it very likely that Congress would ignore any action-prompting mechanism and override
any enforcement procedures. Thus, I do not recommend extending the procedure to
include these bills when the other two legislative formats have not produced a clear
legislative instruction. In years where the appropriations process breaks down (which
tends to affect only some agencies and programs because usually a few of the thirteen
appropriations bills are passed) and the authorization process is unavailable, previously
enacted provisions allocating the authority would remain in effect. If no such provisions
had been passed or had expired, the courts could proceed in the absence of a
congressional delegation, interpreting the regulatory statute as they interpret other laws
and considering agency views as persuasive but not controlling. Alternatively, if the
judiciary was convinced that a background default rule of deference to the agency was
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justified on normative grounds, then courts would understand silence to signal
congressional acceptance of deference in this instance.
A procedural framework would make this issue of delegation more salient to
lawmakers, and it would encourage the use of legislative vehicles that are regularly and
frequently considered. The structure of these laws would enable Congress to make the
proper trade-offs, thinking globally about agencies’ institutional competence, more
specifically about a particular agency’s abilities, and finally about particular statutes and
programs within the agency’s jurisdiction. Although it seems likely that Congress would
often prefer to delegate this aspect of policymaking power to agencies, over which it has
more influence than it does over the independent judiciary, the legislature would likely
reach the opposite conclusion at least some of the time. Not only would some interest
groups work to influence the legislature to favor the courts in some instances, but in the
past Congress has demonstrated a preference for courts to act as the primary interpreter of
regulatory statutes. The Administrative Procedure Act contains such a statement, and the
Bumpers Amendment, that nearly passed Congress, favored courts over agencies in all
circumstances. Senator Bumpers justified his proposal by arguing that courts would
ensure greater fidelity to congressional desires, whereas agencies would follow the lead
of the President or implement their own policy goals notwithstanding congressional
intent.94 Although many in Congress are unlikely to share Bumpers’ preference because
they will understand their greater influence over agencies through oversight,
appropriations, and jawboning, the history of legislative action in this arena suggests that
Congress would sometimes delegate to courts or restrict the delegation to agencies,
particularly when it would have the opportunity to revisit its decision in the future.
C.

Limitations of the Action-Prompting Mechanism and the Need for a
Continuing Judicial Role

Although promising, this proposal has some evident limitations. First and
foremost is the concern that Congress would continue to evade its responsibility and
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avoid express delegations notwithstanding the procedural framework. If Congress were
silent on the delegation issue even after adopting a procedural structure to prompt a
decision, courts might be justified in taking primary responsibility for interpreting
regulatory statutes. Under the traditional approach that is tied to congressional intent,
deference on the basis of delegation would seem inappropriate in such circumstances.
Adopting such a procedure would signal that Congress hoped to provide better directives
to courts; therefore, the absence of an express delegation would have a different meaning
than it does now. To put it another way, if the background rule is that courts are the
primary interpreters of ambiguous statutory text, then congressional silence could be take
to mean that Congress had made the institutional-choice decision in favor of allowing
courts to carry on their usual role. Alternatively, congressional silence could be
understood as a decision by Congress to let the courts determine which institution, courts
or agencies, should have the primary responsibility to make policy through statutory
interpretation. In this case, courts might decide, perhaps on institutional grounds, to adopt
and consistently apply some default rule of deference, understanding that the actionprompting procedure in Congress would make it more likely that the legislature could
vary the default when it wanted to. The point here is a general one: judicial doctrines
should take account of the realities of the legislative process, and legislative process
should be reconfigured to allow Congress a realistic opportunity to take advantage of optout provisions in default rules of judicial review, whatever the content.
Second, the possibility that Congress might allocate law-interpreting power away
from an agency if lawmakers decided that the agency’s performance was unacceptable
would increase the influence of current Congresses over agencies. This in turn might
increase the political pressures on agencies, particularly pressures related to current
political passions. Moreover, it would increase the influence of the committees
responsible for authorization and appropriations bills because they would make the initial
decision about delegating law-interpreting authority, and the full House or Senate would
be unlikely to revisit the decision in the context of deliberation on a lengthy legislative
proposal dealing with many aspects of an agency or with many funding decisions.95 Of
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course, these committees already have substantial influence over agencies because of
their oversight activities, their control over agency budgets, and other formal and
informal tools used to influence administrators.96 Agencies routinely balance the
demands of their competing principals—Congress and the President—within the
structure of the regulatory program enacted by yet a third principal, a previous
Congress.97 While my proposal might marginally increase the influence of current
lawmakers, particularly those on oversight committees, I do not see it as significant
enough to profoundly affect current dynamics.
Third, and relatedly, Congress might decide how to allocate authority between
agencies or courts solely on political grounds. For example, a Democratic Congress,
angry at the policies pursued by the Environmental Protection Agency under a
conservative Republican President, might decide to punish it by instructing courts to pay
no special attention to agency views on statutory interpretation. Of course, this objection
is no different from accusations that can be leveled at Congress with respect to any
delegation of regulatory authority. Political considerations are not illegitimate in this
realm; regulatory policy should be based on a mix of technocratic issues and on political
perspectives that take account of the wishes of the electorate. Both change over time, and
Congress and the executive branch take account of them as they determine regulatory
policy.
It is not clear to me why this context poses a greater risk of inappropriate political
power plays than other arenas. On the contrary, Congress might feel somewhat more
constrained here for several reasons. First, if lawmakers “punished” agencies by taking
away law-interpreting power, they would allocate that power to judges who might be less
Congress that may subvert the objectives of the full body as articulated in statutory commands); Mark
Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 Duke L.J. 1059,
1075-82 (2001) (discussing effect of congressional oversight when the members of oversight committees
have outlying preferences); Jonathan T. Molot, supra note 16, at 1291 (noting that “it is far from clear that
the policy preferences of legislative oversight committees accurately reflect the views of the House or
Senate as a whole”). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, supra note 56, at 23 (noting that effective agencies already
take current political developments into account when making regulatory decisions).
96
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likely to take account of current congressional preferences and who would still pay some
attention to agency views as an extrinsic source of meaning. So the punishment might
rebound, leaving Congress reliant on an institution that it influences less effectively than
it does the agency and that often trusts agencies as the repositories of expertise more than
it trusts the legislature. Second, the use of the authorization process to make the
allocation decision would have interesting temporal effects. Re-authorizations occur
every few years, sometimes every ten years, so lawmakers would be aware that if they
delegated interpretive power to the courts, that decision would likely stay in place for
some time, perhaps past the term of the President with which Congress disagreed. Of
course, Congress could revisit its decision at any time, but the reason an actionprompting mechanism tied to the reauthorization process is necessary is because
Congress does not often act without some internal prod. However, the process would be
an evolutive one. No decision would be final because it could be reassessed as the
political environment changed, although perhaps not immediately given the timing of the
authorization process. Thus, the authorization vehicle would decrease the chance of
severe punishment, because the decision would have some durability, but any
overreaction that occurred could be reassessed in a different political climate. In short,
the charge of “political” decisionmaking is either a claim without much traction in the
world of political actors, or a charge that is no more, and perhaps less, worrisome in this
particular situation.
Even in cases where Congress delegated law-interpreting authority to an agency,
courts would have some independent role to play. First, courts would determine the scope
of the delegation and ensure that the agency had not exceeded its authority nor regulated
past the jurisdiction Congress granted it.98 Deference to agency determinations of these
issues would be inappropriate because agencies are interested parties, with incentives in
some cases to over-reach and in some cases to evade responsibility that clearly had been
placed on them. The court’s job would be to determine the scope of the congressional
delegation, a task made easier with express congressional directives, not to second-guess
the agency’s decision to regulate particular entities or to deal with problems that arguably
98
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come within its mandate. The issue of whether Chevron deference can be applied to
jurisdictional questions has not been clearly settled by the Court;99 in my view, ensuring
an independent judicial analysis to determine the scope of the delegation is vital to ensure
that a relatively impartial entity determines the boundaries of agency authority. Applying
this limitation would be somewhat problematic, however. It is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between a question that concerns the agency’s jurisdiction, which would merit
independent assessment by the judiciary, and a question of applying delegated authority
to a borderline case, in which deference to the agency’s decision would be appropriate
either when Congress had signaled that agency views on the meaning of statutes should
be controlling or when the judicial default rule would understand congressional silence as
such a delegation. One way to resolve the difficulty is to require an independent judicial
role only with respect to broad jurisdictional issues that either expand agency power
substantially or restrict it significantly.100
Second, courts should require that agencies provide reasons for their decisions to
exercise their delegated law-interpreting power in a particular way.101 Not only are
explanations important to promote agency accountability and transparency of
decisionmaking, but agencies should not be allowed to adopt interpretations of statutes
that are clearly erroneous. Only by assessing the analysis that supports a particular
interpretation of vague or ambiguous language can the courts discharge their duty under
the Administrative Procedure Act to reject agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.”102 As long as the agency acted within
the authority delegated to it by Congress, the court should accept any reasonable
99

See Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 989,
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interpretation supported by an explanation, but it would retain a very limited role to play
to take care that the agency did not act irrationally or unreasonably. Perhaps the way to
think about this sort of judicial review is to understand it as a method to detect clear
mistakes.103
In proposing that courts retain a limited role to police the scope of Congress’
delegation to agencies, to ensure reasoned explanations, and to guard against clear error, I
am aware that courts might use any grant of power to avoid deferring to agencies and to
retain primary law-interpreting authority. Particularly in the realm of distinguishing
jurisdictional questions from other questions, the dividing line is blurry, and judgment
calls are necessary. Aggressive judges could use any exception as an invitation to push
the entire judicial camel, nose-first, into the policymaking tent. However, if Congress had
expressly directed that agency interpretations of statutory language should be
“controlling” or otherwise indicated that courts should defer to agencies, deference might
actually occur more than it does now in the world of judicially-constructed rules. In
practice, Chevron has resulted in less deference than one might have expected, and courts
routinely find “clear” statutory meaning at Step One through aggressive use of canons
and other interpretative methods. Although judges could still evade congressional
directives to defer using similar techniques, they might be less likely to do so in the face
of an explicit directive rather than because of one constructed by the courts. Particularly
when the doctrinal justification for deference rests on congressional delegation, even the
most aggressive judge might find ignoring a clear directive passed pursuant to a
procedural framework problematic. Although the concern about judicial opportunism is a
real one, it seems more problematic to deny any role to the courts, and such a course
might well be constitutionally impermissible given Marbury and the structure of
separated powers.
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III. Conclusion
Fundamentally, Marbury v. Madison is a case about allocating power among
institutions of governance. Thus, as we assess it at its bicentennial, we should use it as a
springboard to consider the relationship among modern governance institutions, which
include not only Congress and the courts, but also administrative agencies. Under current
doctrine, informed by Marbury and administrative law precedents like Chevron, the role
that agencies play in law-interpreting and other matters is largely left to Congress to
determine when it delegates authority to the executive branch. In the absence of clear
congressional directives, courts have, in the guise of constructing legislative intent, made
the decision themselves whether to retain the power to interpret statutes or allocate it
mainly to agencies by deferring to reasonable agency interpretations. Whether the judicial
approach is couched in terms of congressional intent, or uses some other basis for
allocating the power to make policy through interpretation, the judicial approaches all
envision that Congress has continuing power to vary any judicial default rule.
Notwithstanding the acceptance of congressional power to override the judiciary
with respect to which institution should interpret laws, no one seriously expects Congress
to act in most cases. We have accepted the courts’ predominant role in this area, in part
because of low expectations with regard to legislative performance. However, a
procedural framework could be crafted to encourage lawmakers to use regularly enacted
legislative vehicles to provide clearer guidance to courts and agencies of their roles with
respect to statutory interpretation. If, notwithstanding adoption of such a vehicle,
Congress still failed to provide direction, congressional silence would have more
meaning, although the meaning would depend on the default rule of judicial review
adopted by courts. When Congress remains mute despite the opportunity to instruct
clearly, some would argue that the role Marbury envisioned for the judiciary would be
appropriate even in the context of regulatory statutes. Or courts might adopt and
consistently apply a bright-line rule favoring agency interpretation over judicial
interpretation, based on technocratic, democratic, or other institutional considerations. In
that case, the action-prompting congressional procedure would allow Congress a
meaningful opportunity to vary such a default.
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My own preference is for the second default rule based on my assessment of the
institutional considerations. But the point of this article is not to argue in favor of one or
the other default rule, but to present a proposal that makes more meaningful the aspects
of judicial review of regulatory statutes that envision a role for Congress. No matter what
the judicial default rule, the procedural framework described here would make the
possibility of its involvement more salient to Congress, and it would encourage the
legislature to consider any variance of the default role in the appropriate context of
authorization bills or, when necessary, appropriations bills. Once judicial review is
situated in the model of a continuing process of interaction among courts, Congress, and
agencies, we can better understand the importance of providing all these groups with the
tools they need to communicate with and respond to the other branches.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Elizabeth Garrett
University of Chicago Law School
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